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abstract
This note presents the special issue on Experimental and Behavioral Economics.  The volume includes some 
recent contributions from these correlated disciplines –empirical the former and theoretical the latter– and 
their potential contribution to the intersection of Economics with Psychology and Sociology. The project “El 
papel de la comparación social en las decisiones económicas bajo incertidumbre” (Junta de Andalucía, P07-
SEJ-03155)” provided us with inspiration and financial support to publish this volume. 
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resumeN
Este trabajo presenta el número especial de Revista Internacional de Sociología dedicado a la Economía 
Experimental y del Comportamiento. El volumen se compone de una serie de trabajos tanto teóricos como 
empíricos ubicados en la intersección de la Economía con la Psicología y la Sociología. El proyecto “El 
papel de la comparación social en las decisiones económicas bajo incertidumbre” (Junta de Andalucía, P07-
SEJ-03155)” nos proporcionó inspiración y financiación para publicar este volumen. 
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This special issue on Experimental and Behavioral Economics reviews some recent con-
tributions from these correlated disciplines —empirical the former and theoretical the 
latter— and their potential contribution to the intersection of Economics with Sociology 
and Psychology. 
 The first two papers are examples of how Game Theory helps us study human behav-
ior. The basic ingredients of game theory is rationality (subjects choose their best option) 
and common knowledge of rationality (everybody knows that everybody is rational and 
everybody knows that everybody else knows that... and so on ad infinitum). A key con-
cept is the solution known as Nash equilibrium. 
 The first paper, “Strategic Interaction and Conventions” (Espinosa, Kovárík & Ponti, 
2012), illustrates how social norms and conventions emerge as coordination devices 
in games with multiple Nash equilibria. However, the paper also shows that a “nice” 
(efficient) equilibrium is not always achieved, that coordination failures are common and 
the relevance of new concepts (for instance, framing, labels, etc.) arising from cognitive 
psychology in this field. As Schelling (1963) noted, some conventions are selected due to 
their intrinsic magnetism, and without any economic justification. 
 The second paper deals with “Bounded Rationality” in individuals’ choices (Balles-
ter & Hernández, 2012). It focuses on two main (computational) problems: backward 
induction and common knowledge of rationality. To explore the difficulty of computing 
backward induction solutions, they use a spatial segregation game where heterogeneity 
among players, in terms of ability, may have critical effects on the final configuration. 
The second issue (common knowledge of rationality) is explored by the Beauty Contest 
Game (BCG in short) introduced by Nagel (1995). This paper highlights the difficulty for 
players to put themselves “in the shoes of their rival” (Theory of Mind, see Baron-Cohen, 
1995). They show that this lack of empathy has clear implications for the final equilibrium 
and how subjects converge to it. 
 Following the previous paper on the lack of empathy, the third paper “The neural basis 
of bounded rational behavior” (Coricelli & Nagel, 2012) uses functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI) to study the neural correlates of human mental processes in BCG. 
This new discipline, Neuroeconomics (see Glimcher, P.W., C. Camerer, R.A. Poldrack & 
E. Fehr, 2008), may help to understand the mental process underlying (bounded) rational-
ity and (out-of) equilibrium behavior. This paper reports correlation between activities in a 
neural network related to mentalizing (empathy) and levels of strategic reasoning. 
 The fourth paper “The lottery-panel task for bi-dimensional parameter-free elicitation 
of risk attitudes” (García-Gallego, Georgantzís, Jaramillo-Gutiérrez & Parravano, 2012) 
proposes a simple task for the elicitation of risk attitudes. This tool captures the two 
essential dimensions of individual decision making under uncertainty: subjects’ average 
willingness to choose risky projects and their sensitivity towards variations in the return 
to risk. This study reports results from a large dataset (mostly Spanish data) and most 
importantly, it provides a parametric statistical approach to estimate both dimensions of 
behaviour. 
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 The fifth paper “Time discounting and pain anticipation: Experimental evidence” 
(Brañas-Garza, Espinosa & Repollés, 2012) applies experimental techniques to medical 
issues. This paper shows that anticipatory pain is related to time discounting. They ratio-
nalize pain anticipation considering that subjects value not only their present wellbeing 
but also their future health status. It shown that some individuals’ weight mainly the pros-
pect of pain associated to a medical procedure and discount heavily the future benefits, 
while others have a higher discount factor (δ) and weight highly the future benefits. 
 The paper “When obese people are more patient than non-obese people: a study 
of post-surgery individuals in a weight loss association” (Budría, Lacomba, Lagos and 
Swedberg, 2012) investigates the rates of delay discounting among obese people 
treated surgically and belonging to an association of those interested in controlling their 
weight. The authors show that obese people display lower discount rates than the refer-
ence group, while differences cannot be attributed to the personality traits available. In 
fact, awareness and commitment, rather than their actual body mass index play a more 
important role in determining delay discounting.
 The last block of papers is devoted to special and rather novel topics. After the deci-
sive paper of Gneezy et al. (2003) on differences in competition by sex, Gender Econo-
mics has become a sound discipline (see Croson & Gneezy, 2009). The other emerging 
topic is, without any doubt, social preferences, that is, the study of how people cares 
about other people (see Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). The paper “Gender differences in 
economic experiments” (Ergun, García-Muñoz & Rivas, 2012) reviews the experimental 
economics literature on gender differences. They focus on four central topics: risk aver-
sion, trust, deception and leadership. They find that an important part of the documented 
“gender-bias” could be explained by sex-role stereotypes however, hormonal differences 
might also have a critical effect. 
 The paper “The puzzle of Social preferences” (Brandts & Fatas, 2012) provides a 
summarizing review of this emerging discipline. They show that individuals are maximiz-
ers (they choose their best option) but at the same time they are concerned about relative 
payoffs and fairness (comparison of own earnings of i-subject versus j-subject) in both 
dimensions (envy and guiltiness), about procedures (not only the payoff but also the way 
how the money was earned), reciprocity, guilt aversion, etc. A large set of social attributes 
of the game that may change subject’s valuation and achieved outcomes.
 Finally, three papers on electricity, water and general oligopolistic markets remind us 
of the importance of behavioral considerations when studying these settings of interac-
tion among economic agents. 
 In the paper “Demand response in experimental electricity markets” (Barreda,  Gar-
cía-Gallego, Pavan, & Sabater, 2012) the authors study subjects’ decisions on the elec-
tric energy they consume. They confirm that, from a social perspective, a dynamic pricing 
system is more efficient than a static one. Moreover, a dynamic scheme with sanctions, 
although less preferred by consumers, is more effective than the one with bonuses in 
order to reduce peak consumption. Finally, dynamic pricing with bonuses reaches a good 
balance between efficiency and consumer acceptance. 
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 The paper “Competitiveness, cooperation, and strategic interaction. An oligopoly 
classroom experiment” (García-Martínez, Gutiérrez-Hita & Sánchez-Soriano, 2012) 
uses classroom data to prove the interesting idea that competition among groups favors 
within-group collusion. Based on an intuitively appealing behavioral argument, the result 
calls for a reconsideration of market theory, as real-world business are often exposed to 
competition among firms from different sectors. In such cases, collusion may emerge 
among potential competitors.   
 In the paper “Managing a duopolistic water market with confirmed proposals: An 
experiment” (García-Gallego, Georgantzís, Hernán & Kujal, 2012) the authors show 
the collusive potential of a novel market clearing mechanism inspired by games with 
confirmed strategies. This finding implies that the rule of thumb used by competition 
authorities against anti-competitive strategies in static contexts is also valid when market 
mechanisms are used to allocate water in complex markets like the one studied here.
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